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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

St. George Thrift and Loan
PIainti f f
v.
Raymond L. Lowe,
Defendant

Case No. 920852CA
Priority 15

Raymond L. Lowe,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
and Appellee.
v.
Gregory A. Knox,
Third-Party Defendant,
and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment for the Plaintentered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County
The Honorable James L. Shumate

ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLEE'S BRIEF
1.

Has Knox alleged a meritorious claim of innocent misrep-

resentation?
2.

Did Knox raise any genuine issue of material fact in re-

sisting Lowe's motion for summary judgment?
1

3.
operation

Is
of

Knox's

claim

U.C.A.

for

Section

innocent

misrepresentation

barred

b

78-12-26(3)?

DEIERMINAIIVE^AUIHORIIY
Utah Code Ann-, Section 78~12-~26 (1953) as amended, is the
central statute relied upon by the Defendant in this case-

In

addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment.
However, because this Statute and Rule are
in full, they are

included

too lengthy to set ou

in the addendum, pursuant to Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and

24(a)(6).

SyMMARY^QF^IHE^ARGyMENTS
1.

Lowe's holding out his property for sale at the asking

price of ^69,900 was a sufficient act of representation to meet
that qualification for Knox's case of misrepresentation.
2.

Knox had a legal basis for relying on Lowe's opinion of

value in circumstances where Lowe denied access to an appraisal.
3-

Knox raised sufficient genuine issues of material

fact

regarding the actual value of Lowe's property at the time of pur
chase on the face of his deposition to resist Lowe's motion for
summary judgment.
4.

Knox's claim oi

misrepresentation is not barred by the

statute of limitations due to his reliance on a faulty appraisal
done by his qualified agent.

*?

ARGUMENTS
I.

LOWE'S ASKING AND BARGAINING PRICE WAS AN ASSERTION AND A
REPRESENTATION.
"A misrepresentation is an assertion not in accord with the

facts."

Comments

a.

N§ture^j3f^asserti^on^

A misrepresentation,

being a false assertion of fact, commonly takes the form of spoken or written words.

Whether a statement is false depends on the

meaning of the words in all the circumstances, including what may
fairly be inferred from them.

An assertion may also be inferred

from conduct other than words."
159 (1979 e d . ) .

(See Restatement 2d, Contracts,

Also, see Crocker z£*Q9LQ~N§t^

224

C«A.2d. 496, (Cal. 1964), an innocent misrepresentation case,
(wherein a seller of closely-held stock had innocently
ued

overval-

i t ) , which states:
It is alleged that such a mistake was made here.
The value of the corporate stock, as reflected
by the assets of the corporation, its business,
its prospects, and its goodwill was^certai^nl^y
§_2§£§=:Ci§I..-£§£.tjL
(emphasis added).
Knox alleges that Lowe advertized his asking price in writ-

ten form, spoke it verbally, and then defended it by other words
and conduct, such as disclosing information about impending road
construction and adjacent E<LM land, and, that these various actions were assertions that his property was worth $69,900.
Record^

pp. 7 7 , 200, 204, 206-209, 216-217).

(See

Also, while subject

to varying opinions, the actual value of Lowe's property was ultimately as much of a material fact as the value of the corporate
stock in the above mentioned Crocker case.

•"!»
o

Thus, in

the context of the rules de-fined by these author-

rities, the representation element of his case for innocent misrepresentation has been properly alleged.

Also, while no Utah

case for innocent misrepresentation can be located, it has been
authoritatively stated that an agreement obtained bv misrepresentation, fraud, or mi stale is generally voidable.
Q§L_:£jL_Q!strict_Ju^
ah 1932).

II.

(See Tan-

649 P.2d 5., (Ut-

(See, generally, Record, at pp. 152-153).

HNOX WAS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN RELYING ON LOWE'S REPRESENTATION OF HIS PROPERTY'S VALUE AS FACT AND NOT OPINION
h)t Restatement 2d, Contracts.* Misrepresentation, 168(2)

(1979 e . ) , under the tstLe "Reliance on Assertions of Opinion,"
it states?
If it is reasonable to do so, the recipient of an
assertion of a person's opinion as to facts not
disclosed and ngt_gtherwi^e_kngwn to the recipient
may properly interpret it as an assertion
(a) that the facts known to that person are A/oT"
incompatible with his opinion,or
<b> that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it.
(emphasis added).

"In such a case," according to the explanation

of this provision of the "Restatement," "the statement of opinion
becomes, in effect, an assertion as to those facts and may be relied on as such."
Thus, in l-nox's situation, Lowe was giving an opinion of the
value of the property at .£69,900.

Because the actual value was

not disclosed and not otherwise !• nown to h no; , (because of his
inability to obtain an appraisal), h no;< was entitled to assume
4

that Lowe knew facts from which he drew his opinion.

And, since

Knox did not have access to those facts, he was legally entitled
to rely on Lowe's version of them.
Well settled law, including that cited by Lowe, is not
in conflict with the rule stated above.

The key phrase from

•'Restatement" at 168 is as to facts "not otherwise known."

In

this case, the actual value of the property, should a jury find
it to be $52,000 as Knox alleges, was a fact "not otherwise
known" to Knox.

If Knox had not sought and/or Lowe not de-

nied access to an appraisal, the knowledge of the actual value
of the property would have been imputed to Knox by case law.
In 1903, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Shag.i.rg^v^ Bg^dberg A 192 U.S. 419, at 422:
Where means of knowledge are at hand, and are
^9y§LL^_§y§li§&l§ to both parties, and the subject of purchase is ogen^fgr_inseect,ign if the
purchaser does not avail himself of these means
he will not be heard to say, to impeach the contract, that he was deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations, (empahsis added)In Wright^Vi^Westside^NurBeryj. 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App„

1990),

a tort case, there was no appraisal sought and no access denied
by the property seller.

(Parenthetically, that case involved,

to Knox's best information, Mr- Pendleton, Lowe's attorney, and
a reversal of the Honorable Judge Shumate's decision at trial
to send the case to a jury).

Thus, in the "Wright" case, as well

as other Utah cases, the purchaser was charged with the knowledge
of facts he could have obtained but for his own negligence.
However, where access to those facts is blocked by the

seller, a jury may find that reliance on what normally would only
be the seller's opinion may be justified.
lQ___£B_i

298

P-

112

i

(See Baird_Vjj._Efl.gw

<Utah 1930), at p. 114).

Not only would

the legal foundation from the "Restatement", and

"Misrepresenta-

tion" 168 allow Knox to rely on Lowe's "opinion" as to the value
of the property as a fact, but a jury could find, in light of the
language from

Shagirg above, (and not contravened by any Utah

authority), that Lowe's property was not "open for inspection,"
that "means of knowledge" were not "at hand," or "equally available" to Knox. (See, generally, Record, at pp. 153-157).
Knox does not rely on Restatement, 2nd, Torts, 542, regarding specialized knowledge of an adverse party, as alleged in
Lowe's brief, for his legal theory of reliance on Lowe's assertions.

Further, Knox concedes he maintains no direct action a-

gainst Lowe for specific misrepresentations as to road construction or unobstructed views from the property.

However, he does

maintain his claim for misrepresentation based upon the disparity
between Lowe's represented value of £69,900 and the alleged actual value of $52,500.

(See Record, pp. 198, 207-213, 218-220,

234-235) .
III.

KNOX RAISED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RESIST LOWE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FACE OF HIS DEPOSITION
In the record are three different opinions regarding the

value of the property.

There is Lowe's assertion inherent in

the $69,900 sales price, stated in pleadings and Knox's deposition.

(See Record, p. 7 7 , 200, 206-209)

6

There is the Miller

appraisal -for $69,500, described in Knox's deposition, (see Record, pp. 253, 214-217, 220-222) and the value of $52,500, from
an appraisal obtained by St. George Thrift and Loan, also from
Knox's deposition as well as the pleadings.
223-226).

(See Record, pp. 78,

Lowe denies Knox's alleged value in his pleadings.

(See Record, pp. 76, 93-94).
Knox initially alleged that the actual value of the Lowe
property was only $52,500 in his verified pleadings.
cord, pp. 76, 7 8 ) .
supported by any
deposition.

(See Re-

Lowe's motion for summary judgment was not

affidavits, but soley by pleadings and Knox's

"Exhibit #1" attatched to the deposition is the

Miller appraisal, stating a value of $69,500 for the property.
Rule 5 6 ( e ) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a defense by other than pleadings when a motion for summary judgment
is supported by affidavits.

Further, "The court may permit af-

fidavits to^be^suBQ^emented^or^OBBQl^d: by depositions, . . .(emphasis added)-

Rule 56(c) states that "The judgment sought shall

be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, - « . tg~
3§i£h§C_yi£h_£!2^

show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."

(emphasis added).

In his summary judgment motion, Lowe brought forth no affidavits-

Thus, on the face of Rule 5 6 ( e ) , it would seem that Knox

could rest entirely on his pleadings, since depositions ar&
plementary to affidavits.

sup-

However, Utah case law has allowed a

•moving party to rely upon a deposition even when there were no
7

af f i davits.

(See UQi.ted_Amer i.can_Li ±e _Ins^_Coi_vJL_Wi.l.l.ey , 444

P.2d 755 (Utah 1968)).

Thus, Knox's deposition, which was pub-

1 i s h e d a n d e r J t e r e d in t o t h e re c o r d in its e n t i r e t y b y L o w e ' s m o tion, was the

"affidavit" before the court.

(See R e c o r d , p p .

130-131)Under the nil e stated i n EL^DkilQ.....EiQ§O.Qi§I....Vi^Ngw^Emgiire^
2gv§l2Ei-Co-.jL ^59

P. 2d 1040 (Utah 1983)s

. . .the trial court may properly conclude that
there are no genuine issues of fact uniess_the
£ §£§--.Q£ --tbl®--.!D2vant<ls_af f idav^t_af £LC(MtLY§:LY
(At 1044, emphasis added)

Footnote " 1 " statess

We assume, without deciding, that summary
judgment may not be entered where the moving
affidavits show OQ_thei.r_£ace that there is
a material issue of fact.
(emphasis added)„
And, under Rule 5 6 ( c ) ,

(wherein summary judgment is only proper

where depositions and other materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material f a c t ) , Knox resists summary judgment successfully if his deposition discloses the existence of
such a factual issue.
Rule 56(e) states that " . . .

affidavits shall be made on

personal knowledge, shall set forth such £acts_as_wou3^d_be_admi>si:LkL^_LQ-§Yid[§Q£^?

anc

* shall show affirmatively that the affiant

is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
upon these requirements, there are

Based

no "facts" in the record

garding the actual value of property.

re-

Neither Lowe's, Miller's,

or the St. George Thrift & Loan's appraiser's testimonies are
the record.

in

All there is is Knox's hearsay testimony about these

8

opinions in his deposition-

Thus, Lowe put -forth no facts into

the record which Knox needed to oppose, (other than by Knox's
pieadi ngs)However, i-f Knox's deposition testimony i,s a -fact about the
disparities in

values between these various opinions, then the

fact o-f Lowe's and Miller's assertions of values at about
$70,000, and the fact of the Thrift's appraisal at $52,500 are
equal footing, since they are
Knox.

The Miller appraisal

on

all opinions given by others to

is no more evidentiary than the

Thrift's appraisals quoted to Knox ov&r

the phone, since all

enter the record through Knox's deposition and pleadings and in
no other way.
QQQIIJL

Thus, Knox meets the test laid out in IhQCngck^v^

604 P-2d 934 (Utah 1979), because he can rely on the spec-

ific fact of the Thrift's appraisal set forth in his deposition,
and need not rely soley on his pleadings.
Further, nothing in

226)n

(See Record, pp- 223-

his deposition contradicts his plead-

ings, as was the case in IhgrQQckSince the only "facts" in Lowe's summary judgment motion
which Knox was required to resist with "evidence" under Rule 56
(c) and

(e) were contained in one deposition, which on its face

shows Knox's claim of a $52,500 appraisal communicated to him by
the Thrift, the district court could not have properly found against Knox on a procedural level.
IV.

MILLER'S MISTAKE IN HIS 1986 OPINION SHOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO KNOX IF KNOX'S RELIANCE THEREON WAS REASONABLE
AND DID NOT PUT HIM ON INQUIRY.
Lowe's argument appears to be that when Knox received the
9

Miller appraisal

in 1986 he was in such a comparable position to

the proponents in both the McCgnki^e and Kgul.i.s cases that discovery of the misrepresentation in 1986 should be imputed to him
as a matter of law.

(See McCgnkig^v^Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801, (Ut-

ah 1974), and K g y l i s ^ v ^ S t a n d a r d ^

746 P. 2d 1182

(Utah App. 1987)* n McQgnjki.e, (not a summary judgment c a s e ) , the dispute was
over reservation of mineral rights in a real estate sales contract.

The party claiming the misrepresentation had constructive

possession of recorded deeds which contained the alleged incriminating facts at the time the sale closed.

Subsequently, the

facts appeared in a title report issued when the property was
refinanced.

Neither document was examined until after the stat-

ute of limitations had run.

The court imputed knowledge of the

facts in the deeds and the title report to the buyer at the time
these documents were issued.
* n H'2klIi§?

a

summary judgment decision, the complainant in-

herited property upon which a service station was built and
leased to Standard Oil.

She discovered after the statute had run

that the station was built partly on a neighbor's property in
violation of the lease agreement.

The court imputed an earlier,

"pre-statute" discovery of the breach to her for the following
reasons:

She had lived on the property for seventeen years, was

aware of neighboring property boundaries, and saw the completed
service station.

The lease agreement had been signed in 1958,

with an extension signed in 1967.

10

In 196S, she became executrix of the estate to which the
lease belonged, and became aware of the existence of the lease
agreement.

However, she never bothered, as either executrix of

the estate or successor in interest, to order copies of the lease
or extension-

When Standard Oil finally furnished copies in

1982, she recognised a breach, had the property surveyed, discovered the station had been built partly on neighboring property,
and brought suitIn these cases, the Court properly imputed constructive possession of key facts to the complainants-

In McCgnki.e, the owner

of property failed to inspect either a deed or a subsequent title
report-

In Kgul^s, an executrix/hier failed to either obtain or

inspect copies of the contracts giving rights to a major asset
probated and then ownedappraisal

Knox, on the other hand, obtained an

immediately upon receiving possession of his property,

and nothing in the appraisal put him on notice that the property
was actually worth only $52,500 when he had paid $69,900The actual value of Lowe's property at the time of Knox's
purchase was a fact-

(See Argument I.)

Assuming that the val-

ue was $52,000, and that Lowe actively concealed it before the
transaction was concluded, the issue becomes the time which Knox
either discovered the $52,000 value or was put on notice or under
a legal duty to discover it.

While Lowe, as a seller blocking

alternative opinions, and Miller, Knox's appraiser, were under
certain legal duties to be accurate in their opinions of the
property's value, Knox's only legal duty was to reasonably rely
11

on their opinions.
Had Lowe consented to an identical appraisal by Miller before the transaction was closed, Knox would have had no basis for
relying on Lowe's opinion, and would be liable for Miller's mistakes.

However, once entitled to rely on Lowe's opinion, (see

Argument I I . ) , which was a misrepresentation, Knox's legal duties
as to when the misrepresentation was discovered flow only from
what a reasonable person would have done in his place.

A reason-

able person could have relied on Miller's inaccurate opinion,
which almost matched Lowe's.
Knox will only be able to prevail at trial if a jury finds,
after examining admissible opinions of experts that are

tested by

thorough cross-examination, that something in the neighborhood of
the .$52,500 value claimed by Knox is a fact.

In a rare case

where a buyer is legally permitted to rely on a seller's misrepsentation of value, (which must be confirmed as a fact by the
jury) there is no precedent for altering the standard as to when
the seller is deemed to have discovered it.

Indeed, the Court

need not worry about creating an exception concerning the running
of the statute.

Knox has an action under existing statutory and

case law.
On the other hand, to impute the facts Miller's appraisal
failed to reveal to Knox would create new law.

Existing law iin-

puts to Knox facts either in his possession or facts he would
have discovered when put on reasonable inquiry.

Imputing to him

the mistake of his qualified agent would indeed stretch the ex-

12

i sting limits of U.C.A. Section 7S-12-26<3) as to when an aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud or mis take.
For such an expansion of the law Lowe cites no authority.

CONCLUSION
The Court will discover that a jury would have a legal basis
for finding that Lowe made assertions and representations regarding the value of this property, that such value was a material
fact, and that Knox was entitled to rely on Lowe's assertions
because the actual value was concealed from Knox through no negligence or fault of his own.
Further, in Knox's deposition, the opinions of Lowe, Miller
and the Thrift's appraisers are
face oi

all put forward.

Thus, on the

his deposition Knox placed genuine issues of fact regard-

ing the value of the property and the time of its discovery before the Court.
Finally, when viewed in the light most favorable to Knox,
facts in the Record regarding the time of the discovery of the
misrepresentation do not as a matter of law deem a 1986 discovery which would place his defense beyond the running of the
statute of limitations.
The Third-Party Defendant continues to seek reversal of the
Order granting Summary Judgment, and a remand for a trial on the
matter.
Dated this 6th day of Apr:L

78-12-26

JUDICIAL CODE

the date of construction, as well as actions
based on injuries occurring within the sevenyear period if no action is filed within that period. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785
P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989).

Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cutshaw, 784 P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v.
Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and
Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A L R 3 d 914.

Time of discovery as affecting running of
statute of limitations in wrongful death action,
49 A.L.R.4th 972.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=»
55(3).

78-12-26. Within three years.
Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this
state.
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except
that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party kpows
/
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; c. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, § 1.
Cross-References. — "Action" includes
special proceeding, § 78-12-46.
Livestock branding, Chapter 24 of Title 4.

Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2.
Three-year period for actions on insurance
contracts, § 31A-21-313.

258

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);

J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§
0
3
nC.J.S.
H 5 J t—
IQ
c Judgments
1A
• ss
Q
49 nC'rJ.S.
§§ ,07
187 •to 01
218.
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55
Failure to give
. , notice of
.. application
.
. for
, de.
r u . ,
[ a u l t J ^ * ^ ^ e ™ *° ** 1S ****** o n l y
by custom 28 A.L.R 3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory, in'
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
f
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse th6
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—•Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.

Appeal.

—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
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